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Abstract

The financial crisis of 2008-2009 set the globally economy into a free-fall,
requiring massive government intervention in order to prevent the entire system from
crashing down. The Dodd-Frank Act, the largest financial reform since the Great
Depression, attempts to move the financial system towards a more stable foundation.
Part 1 discusses the causes of the financial crisis and an overview of the Dodd-Frank Act.
In part 2 explores the reform in the over-the-counter derivatives market with a focus on
the impact to market participants, the impact on the systemic risk of the financial system,
as well as the overall U.S. economy. Part 3 analyzes the remittance transfer rule, which
also carries the theme of transparency within the cross-border payments space. However,
the requirements of the rule will likely result in increased costs and/or decreased choice
for U.S. consumers sending money abroad. In general, the Act does move the financial
system towards a more stable foundation in some areas. It does not however fully
address the drivers of the financial crisis, end “Too Big To Fail”, or prevent another crisis
from happening again. Along the way it creates some unintended consequences that may
hamper the economic recovery.
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Chapter 1: The Financial Crisis and the Dodd-Frank Act
The global financial crisis that spanned the years 2008-2009 has left a very visible
impact on the world economy. The world has a different view towards the world of
finance. Main Street views Wall Street as greedy, excessive risk takers gambling with
taxpayer money. Wall Street veterans, on the other end of the spectrum, long for the
“good old days” without the newly created regulatory burdens collectively known as the
Dodd-Frank Act (the Act) hampering, and sometimes crushing their business models.
The focus of this paper is the Dodd-Frank Act, the largest financial reform since the
Great Depression, and its intended and unintended consequences. However, before one
can discuss the Act one must first cover the events that led to its creation.
Numerous scholarly papers, magazine articles, and books discuss the events that
led up to the financial crisis and the weekend in September 2008 that became known as
“The weekend Wall Street died” by people with a far greater knowledge than I possess. I
will not attempt to offer an in depth analysis on the circumstances that transpired to
create a perfect storm in the fall of 2008. Andrew Ross Sorkin’s novel, Too Big To Fail,
chronicles the months leading up to that September weekend and the after-shocks of the
Lehman bankruptcy. Michael Lewis’, The Big Short, offers insight into the murky world
of credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations that were at the center of the
crisis. Besides these two popular novels, there are countless papers, articles, and other
books that attempt to explain what happened to bring the financial system to the brink of
collapse. I will, however, provide a brief synopsis of events that led the financial system
into the perfect storm that only needed one little push to send the dominos tumbling.

1

In the wake of the financial crisis, the term Glass-Steagall has once again become
a common phrase uttered by the general public. Glass-Steagall refers to the piece of
legislation enacted in 1933 that separated commercial and investment banking. The goal
was to protect customer deposits (the commercial banking side) from the riskier side of
the world of finance (investment banking).

This wall between commercial and

investment banking lasted sixty-nine years until in 1999 the Graham-Leach-Bliley (GLB)
Act tore down the remaining provisions of Glass-Steagall. The worlds of investment and
commercial banking could now be housed under one bank-holding corporation and the
largest financial institutions jumped at the chance to create these financial supermarkets
that became economies of scale.
Another development we see in the final two decades of the twentieth century was
the end of the private-partnership stand-alone investment bank. When investment banks
were private partnerships, the senior partners had a lot of personal money at stake and
this provided the right incentives to engage in sound risk management practices.
However, after these partnerships went public, the senior “partners” had weaker
incentives for sound risk management practices. There is always a risk vs. return tradeoff and given that it no longer was the senior “partners” money that was at risk, but rather
the shareholders’, the incentives for sound risk management practices began to disappear.
The changing landscape on the ownership of the country’s largest investment
banks also coincided with the rapid financial innovation that began to move financing off
balance sheet and into the “shadow banking system”. This area of finance is called
shadow banking because it is done off balance sheet through various special purpose
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vehicles that roll up under the traditional banking legal entity. This is where the phrases
so commonly tossed around during the financial crisis, “credit-default swaps, mortgage–
backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, asset-backed commercial paper, etc,
reside in the world of finance.
The paper titled “Regulating the Shadow Banking System”, by Gary Gorton and
Andrew Metrick focuses on this area of financial markets. Indeed there are many reasons
for activities to move into the shadow banking world, not the least of which is the extra
profits that can be made for these activities which are considered complex and opaque by
the general public. Gorton’s paper focuses on the role of shadow banking in the financial
crisis of 2008-2009 and the fact that for the most part the Act does not attempt to bring
the shadow banking system under a greater regulatory microscope.
The analysis is focused on three activities within the shadow banking world that
provided advantages to traditional financing leading up to the financial crisis: (i) moneymarket mutual funds (MMMFs), (ii) securitization to move financing off the traditional
banks balance sheets, and (iii) repurchase agreements (repo) which used the asset-backed
securities created by securitization and turned them into money like instruments.
Shadow Banking in the Financial Crisis
Gorton (2010) among others argues that the financial crisis was a run on various
forms of what investors had believed safe, short-term debt. Much like in the past, when
there were runs on time deposits, this financial crisis was a run on their “money like
equivalents” in the uninsured space of the shadow banking system. The “run on repo”
was at the center of the crisis and the increase in repo haircuts caused the crisis to spread
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from the subprime mortgage market to other asset classes. As the repo market expanded
in the two decades leading up to the crisis, this coincided with an increase in the amount
of Treasuries held by foreigners and thus not eligible for collateral, we see a shortage of
good collateral available.i With demand exceeding supply there are a few options to
bring the market back to equilibrium. One of those options was to substitute other highquality “AAA” rated securities to fill the supply shortage. However, as the financial
crisis would later reveal, these “AAA” securities were imperfect substitutes to U.S.
Treasuries and it became hard to distinguish good “AAA” from bad “AAA”. When it
becomes impossible to segregate the good from the bad, the market response is as one
would expect, a flight from all “AAA” securities; a run on repo had begun.
The crisis spread further when the Asset Backed Commercial Paper conduits
(ABCPs) and Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) would purchase long run asset
backed securities (ABS) and finance them with short-term debt. This practice was
successful when there was a market for short-term, overnight funding.ii However, as
discussed above, when this market dried up and overnight funding was no longer possible
these ACBPs and SIVs struggled to meet their obligations. The interconnectedness of all
the major financial firms and the fact that all of this happened off-balance sheet, sent the
financial system teetering on the edge of a cliff. No one knew where their counterparties’
other exposures lied and feared a if a firm failed, despite having no or minimal exposure
to the failed firm, they could be brought down due to a counterparty having a large
exposure to the failed firm. MMMFs were also hit during the crisis and as they struggled
to maintain their goal of a net asset value of $1 per share there became a “flight to
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quality” and the crisis in the MMMF space did not subside until the federal government
stepped in an explicitly backed certain MMMFs.iii Just like prior to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation where there had been bank runs on time deposits, the financial
crisis can be viewed in a similar lens of a series of runs on near equivalents of timedeposits that were in the unregulated, shadow banking system.
An Overview of The Dodd-Frank Act:
On July 21, 2010 President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, known as “Dodd-Frank” bringing into effect the most
comprehensive overhaul of financial regulation since the Great Depression. Coming in at
a final form of 849 pages it trumps past pieces of financial legislation. To provide some
comparisons to the sheer size of Dodd-Frank, The Sarbanes Oxley Act, which resulted in
the wake of the Enron scandal, is only 66 pages.

Glass-Steagall, which separated

commercial and investment banking during the Great Depression and to which a call to
return has gained steam following the Great Recession, comes in at a mere 34 pages.iv
The proposed Volcker Rule, “a 21st century Glass-Steagall”, is over 400 pages and its
request for comment works out to approximately 1200 questions.
However, before we jump to analyze the consequences of specific sections and
rules of Dodd-Frank, lets take a step back and look at the legislation as a whole. The Act
is made up of 16 Titles, which are further subdivided into sections. While a majority of
the Act focuses on the overhaul of institutional aspects of financial regulation two of the
titles focus on consumer protection (X and XIV) and within title X of the act we see the
creation of a new regulatory body, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
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This new bureau is intended to bring consumer protection under the eye of one regulator
but as will be discussed further the unique power granted to this regulatory body has
already created much conflict already in Washington. Dodd-Frank also creates a new
council to oversee all of the financial regulatory bodies.

The Financial Stability

Oversight Council (FSOC) is chaired by the secretary of the Treasury and also contains
the head of the Federal Reserve, OCC, SEC, CFTC, FDIC, FHFA, NUCA, and CFPB.v
The goals of the FSOC are to : identify risks to U.S. financial stability, eliminate the
expectations of government bailouts, and respond to emerging threats to financial
stability.vi The FSOC is supposed to cover any gaps in the regulatory landscape that arise
from different regulators charged with certain aspects of the world of finance. Figure 1
shows the complex nature of Dodd-Frank and the authority of the different regulatory
agencies.
The goals of Dodd-Frank can be summarized into two major categories that are
separated but also related.

David Skeel’s, The New Financial Deal, does an excellent

job at analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act and keeping the big picture view that can be
difficult given the size and complexity of the Act. The first aim that Dodd-Frank intends
to achieve is to limit the systemic risk of the financial system.vii During the crisis of
2008-2009 the systemic risk was so great that a crisis in one small particular area of the
financial world (sub-prime mortgages) spread like wildfire infecting the rest of the
system and bringing the world financial system as we know it to the edge of the abyss.
Dodd-Frank does many things in an attempt to limit the systemic risk of the
financial system including removing the ability to rely on credit ratings, requiring hedge
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funds to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission, changes to the
securitization landscape (via risk retention, ABS disclosures, and representation and
warranties filings.) , and designating certain financial institutions as systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) which will face additional capital surcharges.
However, there is also a benefit that comes along with the SIFI designation. While
Dodd-Frank explicitly says that there will be no federal bailouts of financial institutions,
it is very hard to imagine that the government will not step in to prevent a SIFI from
failing given their sheer size and reach in the financial world. Since it is likely that the
government will be forced to bailout a SIFI, these institutions will be able to borrow
money at a cheaper cost than smaller financial institutions.viii

While all of these changes

are intended to limit the systemic risk of the financial system, there are two other huge
overhauls that this paper will focus on in greater detail: the regulation of OTC derivatives
and changes to the remittance transfer landscape.

The former being directly related to

the financial crisis while the other played no role in the events of 2008-2009. The
regulation of OTC derivatives falls under Title VII of Dodd-Frank and is intended to
bring increased transparency to the derivatives market while the intent the remittance
transfer rule is to bring transparency to the consumer around cross-border payments.
The other major goal of Dodd-Frank is the ability to orderly resolve a failed
financial institution without causing further damage to the rest of the financial system.
This stems directly from the chaos that ensued following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.
Dodd-Frank gives the FDIC the authority to place the failed firm into receivership and
unwind the firm in an orderly fashion.ix One way that Dodd-Frank attempts this is via the
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piece of the Act that requires the largest financial firms to submit “living wills”.x This
living will is suppose to be a roadmap for the regulators to orderly unwind the firm.
The argument goes that the FDIC can handle ordinary bank failures now so they
should be able to handle the failures of the largest, systemically important institution
failures with a similar model.xi Anyone with any statistical background knows that you
simply can’t take a model that is significant for one set of data and extrapolate it to data
outside the range. This logic is roughly the same. The FDIC may be successful at
handling smaller bank failures but there are vast differences between a small, community
bank and a systemically important financial institution such as Citigroup or J.P. Morgan
Chase.xii The sheer size and increased complexity associated with the SIFIs compared to
a small, community bank would be like a bike manufacturer entering into the aeronautical
business. Both can take you where you want to go, they just use very different means to
do it. Skeel argues that the resolution authority laid out in Dodd-Frank is far from the
“orderly” adjective placed in front of it in section 210 of the Act. In fact the way the Act
structures the resolution authority will lead to a series of ad-hoc interventions that don’t
provide managers of a firm the right incentives to prepare for an orderly resolution. The
“living will” is a good idea on paper, but in practice it may be much more troublesome to
execute.
Now that we have discussed the general overview of the Dodd-Frank Act we will
take a deep dive into some specific rulemakings that have arisen from the Act and
analyze their intended and unintended consequences to the financial system and the
general public. Parts of Dodd-Frank are good, some are bad, an some are just plain ugly.
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The reform of the Over-the-Counter derivatives market is a radical change but is
generally viewed as the “good”. While that section reform is aimed at limiting the
systemic risk of financial institutions another rule analyzed in this paper is the first rule
issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The intent of the Remittance
Transfer rule is good-natured in theory; to provide greater transparency to consumers
sending money overseas. However, as the rule is written and the challenges it poses,
consumers could end up being harmed through increased costs for international money
transfers. Furthermore, this rule played no part in the financial crisis. The following
sections will provide a greater analysis of these topics.
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Chapter 2: Reforming the OTC Derivatives Market
The mere mention of the word “derivatives” in the context of finance gets a horrid
reaction from most of the general public. During the financial crisis, financial derivatives
jumped into the mainstream vocabulary, an example for what is wrong with the financial
system that led the country to the edge of an economic collapse. While almost everyone
agrees that derivatives did play a role in the financial crisis, there is less agreement on
how to fix the derivative markets in order to prevent a repeat of the events leading up to
the fall of 2008. Naturally derivatives are a key component of the Dodd-Frank Act; they
get an entire title all to themselves.xiii Before we jump in and analyze the impact of
Dodd-Frank on the derivatives markets lets take a step back and talk about some of the
characteristics of these markets.
The majority of trading derivatives occurs in what is known as the Over-the
Counter (OTC) marketplace. The OTC market dominates the exchange-traded market for
derivatives in terms of notional value.

According to the Bank of International

Settlements, at the end of 2011 the global outstanding notional value of OTC derivative
contracts was around $648 trillion.xiv

Notional amount means the amount of the asset

underlying the derivative (e.g. a interest rate swap on a $100 million dollar loan)
compared to what a party would be required to swap with its counterpart. The notional
value of the market is sometimes misconstrued as the risk the derivative market places on
the world economy. It is very convenient for opponents of OTC derivatives to use this
number in describing the risk posed by these markets. However, the true risk to the
derivatives market is much smaller than the notional value. The true risk posed by a
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derivative contract is the amount that changes hands between the counterparties. A $1
billion interest rate swap does not equate to a $1 billion at risk if interest rates move. The
true risk is a small fraction of the notional value. In this example if the contract requires
one counter party to pay a fixed percentage of notional value while the other pays a
floating amount based on market rates the at-risk amount is the difference between the
fixed percentage and the market rate. For simplicity’s sake let’s set both at 4% at the
time the contract is entered into. If the market rate shifts by 50 % dropping down to 2%
or rising to 6%, which is an unusually large change, the at-risk amount becomes $20
million or just two percent of the $1 billion notional amount.
The term, over-the counter describes the fact that these contracts are privatively
negotiated between the two counterparties. There is little to no regulatory oversight as
these contracts happen away from the regulators playground of exchanges. There are
many reasons for entering into an OTC derivative compared to an exchange traded
derivative but essentially the custom nature of the OTC contacts (it is specifically drawn
up and agreed by both counterparties) is one of the main reasons firms enter into OTC
derivatives.

The problem with OTC derivatives is that you are relying on your

counterparty to make good on their commitments. This becomes troubling when you do
not know the exposure your counterparty has to other parts of the market. As discussed in
the introduction, the world of shadow banking makes uncovering counterparty exposure a
very difficult task. In the financial crisis, firms feared the worst of the exposure their
counterparties had to the broader OTC market and assumed the worst and retreated from
the market by closing out open trades.xv When this became systemic we saw a rapid
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liquidity drain that exacerbated the financial crisis that resulted in the extinction of a
major stand alone investment bank in the United States
Dodd-Frank attempts to change the OTC market and bring it away from the
shadow-banking world and into a more exchange-like market. The CFTC and SEC are
the main two regulators of the OTC market. The CFTC handles swaps while the SEC is
in charge of security-based swaps. For simplicity’s sake this paper will focus on the
CFTC regulated swaps but a natural link to security based swaps can be made. The
major difference between the two definitions is the underlying assets of the derivative.
At a very high level view the reforms laid out for the OTC derivative market can be
thought of in two groups: increased oversight for swap dealers and major swap
participants and increased transparency.

While many of the derivative rules are still

being finalized, the core elements of Dodd-Frank, Title VII, will allow us to analyze the
impact to the OTC markets. Prior to focusing on Dodd-Frank’s reform of the derivatives
market we will cover some basic functions a derivative contract plays.

A Primer on Derivatives
Financial derivative is a very general term for a set of financial products that have the
same underlying theme; that their value is derived based on an underlying asset. That
underlying asset can be essentially anything. Derivatives have been constructed based on
interest rates, commodity prices, foreign exchange rates, credit receivables, etc.
Derivatives allow users to hedge against unexpected price movement in the markets.xvi
For example, a farmer wants to hedge against price fluctuation of his corn crop and thus
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sells a futures contract locking in a set price for that season’s harvest. This allows the
farmer to better manage his risk in that his livelihood is no longer subject to the whims of
the weather.
The social gain of derivatives is that it shifts risk away from those who are willing
to pay to avoid it towards those who can be paid to accept it. They allow for a more
efficient allocation of risk. That said, it is easy for a detractor of derivatives to say that
the banks should not be the ones accepting this risk. However, banks are in a better
position than an individual to manage risks like this. We return to our farmer example to
explain this concept. The farmer enters into a futures contract with the bank that shifts
the risk of a weather event negatively impacting his crops and thus reducing the amount
he receives for them to the bank. The bank can then turn around and offset the risk
gained by entering into the futures contract with the farmer by an offsetting position with
another customer.

The bank acts as the market maker bringing buyers and sellers

together. This is a much more efficient process than the time it would take the farmer to
find the counterparty willing to take the other side of the futures contract. Thus we have
a social gain from derivatives when banks facilitate the more efficient shifting of risk
among counterparties.

Another key benefit that derivatives play is in lowering the

financing costs for firms who use derivatives as risk mitigating devices. A firm that uses
derivative contracts to hedge against credit risk, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, etc.,
is more likely to receive better financing terms from a bank extending credit than a firm
that is not hedged. A well-hedged firm is much more likely to repay its loans compared
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to a firm that is exposed to shocks in the market that could potentially bring the firm
under, thus resulting in a loss for the bank who extended the credit.xvii
Of course there are two sides to every coin and certain entities can use derivatives
to speculate. How one speculates in derivatives is by acquiring a large position in
derivative contracts without a hedge on the underlying asset value.

For example

amassing a large position in credit default swaps that are profitable as long as housing
keeps going up without having hedges in place in the event that housing prices move the
other way. However speculation is a natural by-product of risk mitigation and the market
over time typically makes the speculators bear a cost for their position Barrings Bank,
Long-Term Capital Management, Lehman Bros, and many other firms would be able to
verify this if they were still around to tell their story.xviii As free market enthusiast and
ex-CEO of BB&T John Allison describes, firms who speculate and poorly manage their
risk should fail.

xix

It is an economic cost of their business strategy. One point to note,

before all three firms mentioned above crashed, rather magnificently and publicly, they
all had runs of above average profitability.
In its simplest form derivatives shift risk from those who lack the appetite to those
who are willing to accept it. Derivatives typically benefit both parties in the contract
otherwise the contract wouldn’t be accepted. It is illogical to think that a firm would
willingly enter into a contract that will harm its financial condition. Banks play a key
role in this market by bringing buyers and sellers together with the bank acting as a
counterparty to each side of the trades. We now turn our attention to the increased
oversight of the major players in the swaps market.
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Regulation of Swap Entities
Many of the legal entities in which OTC derivative trading occurs are not subject
to the same regulatory oversight as some of their sister entities under the same parent
company umbrella. Dodd-Frank attempts to change that by requiring Swap Dealers and
Major Swap Participants to register with the CFTC subjecting them to oversight that did
not exist prior to Dodd-Frank.
These requirements include business conduct standards, recordkeeping, and
reporting requirements.

One of the big requirements of registration is a set of capital

requirements, which for many entities that will become swap dealers it will be something
that they were not previously subject to or the new requirement is at a higher level of
capital than previously held. As defined by the CFTC a “Swap Dealer” is anyone who:
holds itself out as a dealer in swaps, makes a market in swaps, enters into swaps as part of
its regular course of business, or is known by the Street as a dealer in swaps.xx The spirit
of this requirement makes logical sense, these swap entities were undercapitalized in the
financial crisis exacerbating the crisis. Therefore, increasing capital requirements for
these entities would allow them to better withstand any “storm” that could lead to a
government bailout. One of the broad themes of Dodd-Frank is to reduce systemic risk.
By subjecting the key swap entities to capital requirements the risk of a bailout due to
undercapitalization is shrunk. On paper this fits right in with one of the central themes of
Dodd-Frank.
The cause for concern here being echoed by the industry is that this will increase
the cost of entering into a derivative contract. If banks have to hold additional capital
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requirements for their swap entities one can be assured that some of this additional cost
will be passed along to the counterparties who are entering into the swap contract. This
will in turn reduce the benefit for a firm to enter into a swap as part of a risk mitigating
hedging strategy.
A very contentious requirement imposed on swap entities is known throughout
the industry as the “push-out” provision; it is also known as the “Lincoln Amendment”
for the senator from Arkansas who introduced this into the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 716
of the Dodd-Frank Act requires all swaps not covered by the National Banking Act of
1864 to be pushed out of entities receiving assistance from the Federal Government.xxi
This rule only applies to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants; end –users are
exempt from the push out provisions.

However, almost every derivative contract

involves at least one entity that will either become a Swap Dealer or Major Swap
Participant. At first glance the intent of this portion of the regulation makes sense; it
separates certain swap activities perceived by the public as “risky” from the assistance of
the federal government. The hindsight reaction of the financial crisis is that there was
little downside risk or incentives to not engage in swap dealings since the firms believed
the federal government will step in and bail them out if they get in trouble. This rule
alters the incentives for swap dealers to take on the same level of risk as, for the most
part, they will be removed from the backstop of federal assistance. The problem with this
analysis is it is very difficult to analyze a Dodd-Frank rule in a silo. In the broader
context of the derivatives market and looking at actual data the swap “push out” rule
loses the strength that it is limiting speculative swap trading. This paper will analyze the
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swaps push out rule in two lenses: first are the asset classes required to be “pushed out”
truly reducing systemic risk by discouraging speculative swap trading and second turning
an eye to the international impacts of this rule.
The three asset classes that are required to be “pushed out” of federally insured
entities are commodities, equities, and non-investment grade credit default swaps. First
off, two of these asset classes had little role in the financial crisis. Commodity or equity
swaps were not impacted by the financial crisis; the price volatility discussed in detail
later provides evidence of their lack of involvement in the financial crisis. Before we
compare the riskiness of these asset classes let’s take a look at the broader market and
examine their market share of the OTC markets. One would think that given the CDS
market and all the problems caused by CDS during the financial crisis this would be a
significant portion of the swaps market. The devil lies in the details; the interest rate
OTC market dwarfs all other asset classes combined. At the end of 2011 out of the $648
trillion notional amounts outstanding, approximately $505 trillion falls in the interest rate
asset class.

Commodities and equities combined add up to slightly less than $10

trillion.xxii Even at the height of the financial crisis the swaps that are to be subject to the
push-out provision only accounted for 5% of the total notional amounts outstanding.xxiii
Now that we see the “push-out” market share is very small in the grand scheme of
the OTC market let’s analyze the objective that this rule will end risky speculative trading
by entities receiving federal assistance. Since some asset classes are permitted by the
National Banking Act of 1864 and thus are not required to be pushed out by section 716
there can be an analysis using price volatility to test the assumption that these asset
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classes are riskier comparatively to the interest rate and foreign exchange asset classes. If
these asset classes are indeed riskier and should be pushed out to limit the risk of a public
bailout due to a commercial bank engaging in risky swap trading, then these asset classes
should exhibit riskier price volatility than those of interest rate and foreign exchange
asset classes.

Using moving averages of trading revenue as the indicator of price

volatility the data shows the opposite to be true.xxiv Foreign exchange and interest rate
swaps exhibited greater price volatility than credit, commodity, and equity asset classes.
In fact, commodity and equity asset classes exhibited the least price volatility and
experienced no shock due to the financial crisis. Credit swaps did see a level of high
volatility during the crisis but have since tempered off. xxv The lack of volatility in equity
and commodity swaps augments the statement that these asset classes are unnecessarily
characterized as risky. While sub-investment grade credit derivative swaps did play a
substantial role in the financial crisis, the swaps push-out rule tends to unfairly punish
two innocent asset classes.
When the push-out provisions take effect in the summer of 2013 what are the
options for the banks? The options for banks to consider are (i) stop trading in the pushout derivatives, (ii) push these asset classes out into another entity, which will subject that
entity to the additional capital requirements or (iii) push out all derivatives into the new
entity. Since derivative trading is a profitable business one would not expect the big
commercial banks to stop trading in these asset classes. Let’s examine the consequences
of option (ii): pushing out the equity, commodity and non-investment grade derivatives
into a separately capitalized entity. These separate swap entities are not as highly rated as
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their federally insured counterparts and therefore the cost of the swap contract is now
increased as the dealer’s cost of capital is greater than those when the contract could be
traded with a federally insured institution.

For equity and commodity swaps this

increased cost seems unjustified since they played no role in the financial crisis and the
data indicates they are no more likely to spark a future crisis.xxvi Also, many firms are
currently able to engage in loans and derivatives from the same entity thus reducing the
overall credit risk of that firm to the bank and thus allowing for a cheaper cost of
borrowing for the firm. Once the push-out provisions become effective the firm will now
have to enter into a loan and derivative contract with two different entities of the parent
company thus the borrowing costs are increased both explicitly (new swap entity is not as
highly rated and thus requires additional collateral) as well as implicitly (opportunity cost
of time of setting up all the new legal agreements required to enter into a swap) for the
firm.xxvii
Another unintended consequence of the push-out provision is that the cost of
creating a separately capitalized entity may push those banks that are on the margin out
of the business thus increasing the concentration of derivative holdings to a smaller set of
firms thereby countering the goal of reducing systemic risk across the industry. These
smaller community banks provide risk mitigation for their clients through offering
commodity swaps, which allow the firms to hedge the risk of price fluctuations for their
product.

Ms. Richardson’s analysis shows that for banks falling into the mid-size

regional banks, between $10-$50 billion in assets, the main type of derivative held was
in-fact commodity derivatives and not the sub-investment grade credit default swaps that
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were a contributing factor to the financial crisis.xxviii These banks may not find the cost
of setting up a swap entity worth the gains achieved from remaining a participant in these
asset classes. The result would be less choice for clients as the amount of swap dealers
shrinks for these markets. One point of note here is that the concentration of push-out
derivatives held by the big banks is skewed due to the fact that the sub-investment credit
derivatives are likened to commodity and equity derivatives. According to the Bank of
International Settlements at the end of 2011 the notional amount outstanding for noninvestment grade credit default swaps was $5.49 Trillion.

Comparatively, the total

notional outstanding for equity swaps and commodity swaps was 1.738 and 1.745
Trillion respectively.xxix That said, the push-out provision will have implications that go
far beyond the banks commonly referred to as “Too Big to Fail” and may actually
increase the importance of these banks as the regional banks exit from the market due to
the increased costs from having to “push-out” equity, commodity and sub-investment
credit derivatives into separately capitalized entities.

Firms will be deterred from

entering the market because of the significant barriers to entry.
Another major concern is the extraterritoriality applications of the Title VII
Reforms of the OTC Derivatives market. Indeed the market for derivatives has been
expanded as the globalization boom has taken hold in the past few decades. US dealers
can enter swaps with foreign companies and US companies can enter swaps with foreign
dealers. This becomes a big issue as various foreign governments are attempting to
reform each of their respective financial systems after the crisis. One of the big concerns
here is international coordination; one only needs to look within our own country to see
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the problem of coordination at the governmental level. The European Monetary Union’s
struggles implementing austerity measures in return for a bailout of the PIIGS also
augments the problem with coordination at the international governmental level.
Coordination is key or we could have instances such as double swap clearing and doublereporting as both sides of the trade are required to clear & report the swap locally.

xxx

One of the major concerns is that the US, being the leader at the regulatory forefront,
would adopt rules governing OTC derivatives that are not universally adopted. The
“push-out” provision is a case in point. Even though other areas of the globe have begun
drafting their proposals to overhaul the OTC derivative market there seems to be little
sign of following the US down the path of requiring certain asset classes to be “pushed
out.” xxxi
Well, if foreign regulatory bodies do not follow suit with the “push-out” rule what
are the implications to US banks? For one, foreign banks are now at a competitive
advantage compared to US banks. For simplicity’s sake let’s assume each bank, one US
and one foreign, uses their insured depository institutions to house a majority of their
swap dealing business. Also these banks’ insured depository subsidiaries have the same
credit ratings. As discussed above, one the advantages of doing this is the cheaper cost
of capital. Now the US bank has to “push-out” certain or all swaps to a separate
capitalized entity. This entity now has an implied higher cost of capital because it is not
as highly rated compared to its insured depository institution brethren. It lacks the
government backing that keeps the cost of borrowing low. So now it becomes more
expensive for this new swap entity to deal in swaps. Naturally, one would assume, some

21

of this cost will be borne by the other side of the trade entering into the swap with the
dealer, the consumer of the swap. This cost could come to fruition in many different
ways. For one, the counterparty must now post higher amounts of collateral at the swap
entity compared to the swap dealer. Also, the benefits of cross netting are reduced as a
counterparty keeps its interest rate and FX swaps at the insured entity and its equity and
commodity swaps are now within the new swap entity. Meanwhile, the foreign bank
counterpart does not have to push out its swaps and the counterparty could keep all of the
trades with the insured depository entity. This is cheaper because a) the dealer has a
higher credit rating, which means less collateral need be posted, and b) the benefits of
cross-netting can be realized as the counterparty holds all swaps with that dealer under
the same entity.
The impact of the “push-out” rule has two unintended consequences. The first is
that it harms the banks on the margin that would exit the market as the cost of creating a
separate swap entity to continue to act as a dealer would not be worth the gains. This
would further concentrate the market for these asset classes as only the larger banks who
have extensive swap business, which already make up greater than 95 % of the market
would pick up additional market share. Also, as a group, US dealers would be at a
competitive disadvantage compared to their foreign counterparts who will most likely not
be subject to a similar push out provision. This could result in a shift of business from
the US to foreign locations where entities are not subject to these provisions. Ignoring
the direct affect this has on the American economy through the loss of business, this also
undermines one of the goals of Dodd-Frank. That is, to reduce systemic risk through an
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overhaul of the OTC derivatives market by driving trades that would currently happen in
the US outside of our shores and away from the eyes of the US regulatory authorities.
Now that we have analyzed the impacts of the Title VII rules to the swap entities we can
take a look at the regulations impacting the particular swap transactions to discuss their
impact on the future of banking.

The Regulation of Swap Transactions
As discussed before, one of the main issues in the financial crisis was the lack of
insight firms had into counterparty exposure, more formally known as, counterparty
credit risk. In plain English, counterparty credit risk is the risk that the counterparty on
the other side of the transaction will not be able to meet its obligations. This is a
common component across the banking world. For example, there is counterparty credit
risk when the bank issues a mortgage so a couple can buy a home. The counterparty
credit risk is the risk that the couple will not able to meet their obligations to pay back the
mortgage and the bank stands to lose the money they lent to the couple. If the couple
fails to payback the mortgage the bank can step in and foreclose on the house,’ i.e., they
take over ownership of the house. This ability to foreclose if the couple does not meet
their obligations serves as a form of collateral; the bank is not at a complete loss for the
principal amount they lent out in the mortgage because they are able to acquire the house
which has some monetary value attached to it and thus offsets a portion of the loss on the
mortgage loan.
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The concept is similar with derivatives. If a situation worsens and it looks more
likely that the counterparty will not be able to meet its obligations the firm can require
that party to post collateral, known as margin, to offset the new change in events leading
to a higher likelihood of not that the party will not be able to fulfill their obligation. The
problem in the derivatives market that is not as prevalent in the housing market is what is
constitutes acceptable collateral. In a mortgage “trade” one party receives a physical
asset, the house, while the other party is promised that their money will be repaid plus
interest. The physical asset becomes the piece of collateral the one party can collect in
case the counterparty fails to meet its obligations. However, in the derivatives market
there is no physical asset easily posted as collateral. A derivative trade involves the
exchange of funds based on the change in underlying value of a financial asset, although
as evidenced by Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) there can be a connection between
physical assets and a derivative trade. As mentioned earlier, Gorton and Metrick argue
that the lack of high-quality collateral contributed to the financial crisis.xxxii Typically,
margin calls, request for additional collateral, are invoked when the counterparty’s
situation worsens. This makes logical sense. However, in the world of OTC derivatives
it is very difficult to determine when the counterparty’s situation worsens since the
positions taken are all done bilaterally off-exchange which makes calculating exposure
very difficult. The fall of 2008 showed what happens when firms assumed the worse
about their counterparty’s exposure.
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Game Changer: Central Clearing of Swaps?
One of the main goals of Dodd Frank is to increase the transparency of the
derivatives markets in order to provide greater security to the financial system.xxxiii One
of the main ways Dodd-Frank attempts to increase the transparency of the financial
system is the introduction of a new major player to the swaps game: the central
clearinghouse. Dodd Frank gives the regulators the power to determine which swaps will
be required to be centrally cleared through a clearinghouse (CCP).

xxxiv

The concept of

central clearing changes the game for how swap trades are settled. Prior to Dodd Frank,
clearing and settlement for OTC derivatives happened bilaterally between the
counterparties whereas in the post-Dodd Frank world the counterparties will use a
middleman, the clearinghouse, who backstops each of the parties in the swap trade. The
counterparty risk is shifted over from the parties in the swap transaction to the
clearinghouse. In return for accepting this risk the clearinghouse will require margin to
be posted by both parties of the transaction to help the clearinghouse absorb shocks in the
markets. Margin comes in two forms’; initial margin, which is posted at the point of
initiation, as well as variation margin, which are adjusted to reflect changes in the
underlying assets of the swap.
This shift in risk from the various financial firms to a central clearing party should
help with the uncertainty of counterparty credit risk that exacerbated the financial crisis
in 2008. Well, that depends on what the market for the number of central clearing parties
ends up as. If there are one or two central clearing parties then we will not see the end of
the “Too Big to Fail”, but rather a shift from the country’s largest banks to the central
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clearing houses. A very small number of clearinghouses takes risks currently spread out
across many firms in the derivatives market and centralizes them into one or two places,
the clearinghouses. The failure of one of these clearinghouses could devastate financial
markets.xxxv The prospect of multiple clearinghouses poses another set of risks, albeit
these may be the worse of the two. The presence of multiple clearinghouses leads to
competition for business and thus the risk that competitive forces lead to lax standards
required for a clearinghouse to accept a swap for central clearing counteracting the effect
of requirement.xxxvi
Another view of the requirement of central clearing suggests a limited number of
clearinghouses will be the likely outcome. It is embedded in human nature that the
ability to conduct all your needs in the fewest spots possible is desired, providing
evidence that there are economies of scale in serving consumer choice. The rise of WalMart, sporting good stores, major department stores, and many others support this
statement. People would rather go buy their meat, fruit, vegetables, bread, and snack
food at one grocery store instead of going to a butcher shop, bakery, and farmers market
to get the same products. The opportunity cost of time is a vital component of the
consumer utility function, which we will revisit in the second half of this paper when we
focus on another aspect of Dodd Frank.
Firms have similar behaviors to that of consumers in that they want to conduct
their business in the most efficient way possible.

As mentioned in discussing the

implications of the swap push-out provisions where firms would rather deal with one
entity for all of their swaps to take full advantage of the benefits of cross-netting the same
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logic can be applied to the swap entities. A swap entity would rather post collateral at
one clearinghouse for all its swaps, to take advantage of cross netting, instead of posting
collateral at multiple clearinghouses.xxxvii
A regulatory requirement that goes hand-in-hand with central clearing is that a
swap required-to-be cleared must be traded over a newly created Swap Execution
Facilities (SEFs). Along with central clearing, requiring swaps to be traded over a SEF is
a huge shift in moving towards an increase in transparency of the swaps market. The
bilateral nature of the current way the OTC market deals in swaps leads to very opaque
pricing, which allows for sizable profits for the dealing entities that benefit from the
asymmetric information advantage. While other market participants could attempt to
acquire the information to ensure a level playing field the cost to acquire the information
tends not to be worth the incremental gain that the participant would realize from the
extra information. Requiring swaps to be traded over the SEFs attempts to put an end to
the opaque nature of pricing in the swaps market. There will be significant impacts on the
revenues the largest firms earn in this space. As information becomes more publically
available one would expect some price compression among the market makers who have
benefited from the opaque nature of OTC derivatives as well as their asymmetrical
information advantage. According to a Deloitte study for the Swaps and Derivatives
Market Association (SDMA), the predicted loss in revenue could be as great as 30-35%
due to the increased transparency.xxxviii In aggregate terms that is a reduction in $15Bn in
revenues according to the New York Times.xxxix
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Given the expected compression in profit margins in dealing with swaps that are
required to be cleared one would think there is a strong incentive for the major swap
players to do everything in their power to keep the majority of swaps away from the
mandatory clearing requirements and their corresponding exchange trading requirements.
There is, however, an additional twist for un-cleared swaps; these are subject to
additional margin requirements. The margin rules for un-cleared swaps have yet to be
finalized but there are two corresponding proposed rules that lay out the basic framework
the regulators are considering. One rule is issued for swap entities that are regulated by a
prudential regulator (e.g. OCC) and another by the CFTC for swap entities not regulated
for a prudential regulator. While there are some differences between the two proposals,
there are common themes, including that margin be segregated at a third party custodian,
and the big one, that the margin is greater compared to a cleared swap of similar
characteristics.xl So there is an increased cost in trading in un-cleared swaps that presents
itself by the additional margin requirements.
Now that we have discussed the requirements for both cleared, exchange traded
swaps as well as those for un-cleared bilateral swaps, we roll things up to a higher level:
what will the derivative market look like 5 years from now? Ideally the goal of the
regulators is to move as many swaps as possible to a centrally cleared, exchange-traded
environment. This increases transparency and thus limits systemic risk by reducing the
uncertainty of counterparty credit risk, although it also potentially concentrates risk in the
central clearinghouses. The ability to reduce the risk lies in the ability of the regulatory
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bodies to catch any signs of trouble earlier than if the risk is spread out among many
financial institutions.xli
The ability to move the majority of swaps into the centrally cleared category is
another component that impacts the success of increasing transparency.

One can

naturally expect the first swaps to migrate toward a central clearing model to be the
“plain-vanilla” swaps, these are relative common standard swap transactions that make
themselves the most eligible candidates for central clearing environments. As evidenced
by the Bloomberg study the main reason banks enter into swaps is to mitigate risk rather
than speculate on price fluctuations. Of course banks do profit from their market making
activities as well so derivatives serve dual purposes. One benefit of the current business
model of off-exchange bilateral swaps is the customizable nature of the contracts. As
firms became bigger and more complex their risk profiles followed suit. Firms can enter
into very customized swap contracts that allow them to better mitigate their risks than a
standard “plain-vanilla” swap. That is one reason the OTC market developed the way it
did. It provided banks with the ability to tailor specific swap contracts to fit their unique
risk portfolios. If the “plain-vanilla” swap satisfied the bank’s risk mitigation strategy
there would not have been a need to undergo the costs to develop the more customized
swaps for risk mitigation. However, as the interest rate and credit risk profiles of the
banks became more complex due to evolutions in financial products the demand for
customizable swaps soon followed. Professor Darrell Duffie, who has done extensive
work on the derivatives markets, predicts that about 80 % of swaps will be subject to
mandatory clearing.xlii We are now faced with the 80/20 predicament; that is will 80% of
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the swaps entered into be the 20% that are still traded off-exchange thus minimizing the
effect of increased transparency provided by central clearing and exchange trading? Like
everything else, that determination comes down to a favorite tool of economists, the costbenefit analysis. For a bank to satisfy a particular demand, they must determine which
path will yield the biggest spread in benefits compared to costs, or in other words, for the
same level of benefit, which will be the least costly for the banks. To determine this it all
comes down to the compression in profit margins on the cleared swaps compared to the
increased costs for an un-cleared swap. While there are additional costs for trading in uncleared swaps, these could be potentially offset by the profit margin gained due to
asymmetric information on the side of the swap dealer. Essentially there is a trade-off.
The cleared swaps are cheaper, but yield less return and also potentially don’t mitigate
risks as well as the more customizable swap and the swaps that better mitigate risk are
more expensive. This contradicts the goal of Dodd Frank of reducing systemic risk.
One possible solution would be for the regulators to issue rules in a manner where
a bank has more of an incentive to trade in centrally cleared swaps. Presumably this
would occur through margin requirements for un-cleared swaps that would erase any
asymmetrical information advantage, the driver that boosts profit margins and could pose
serious challenges in determining the right amount of additional margin requirements.
While only time will tell what happens, banks will have a strong incentive to keep their
most lucrative swap contracts away from the transparent exchange trading environments.
This should not be overly difficult in the near to immediate term as the most
customizable swaps, and arguably the most profitable, will be difficult to standardize to a
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level needed to move onto a centrally cleared, exchange like environment. Even when
regulators find a way to move these swaps to the centrally cleared exchanges, there will
be some “new” product created that is traded off-exchange and thus can reap the rewards
of the profit margin. There need to be proper incentives in place to see the majority of
the swaps business move onto centrally cleared environments. According to the author
Satyajit Das’s extremely insightful, yet cynical portrait of the derivatives markets is there
are two categories that everything in derivatives falls into.
“knowns” and “unknowns”.xliii

It is a combination of

What is “known” about Dodd-Frank’s overhaul of the

OTC derivative markets is that Dodd Frank will increase the transparency of derivatives
and thereby ease some of the uncertainty that was present in 2008 and which exacerbated
the financial crisis. The “unknown” is just how much will we see the systemic risk
reduced by increased transparency. Central clearing does not eliminate counterparty
credit risk or end “Too Big to Fail”. Swap dealers still have incentives to keep swaps offexchange to utilize the increased profit margins caused by asymmetrical information.
While the new regulations are an improvement from the pre-crisis regulation of
derivatives, the outstanding question remains on the magnitude of the improvement.
That magnitude is contingent on the regulatory bodies implementing rules that provide
the right set of incentives for the players and also their ability to enforce the requirements
necessary to realize the gains of central clearing and exchange trading.xliv One thing that
is a “known” is that banks will always attempt to create new financial products that will
not be subject to the current regulatory rules that compress profit margins. There is too
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much money at stake to not expect institutions to come up with new creative ways to
realize some of the gains to be had.
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Chapter 3: Consumer Regulation and its Impacts on Choice
While a majority of the Act focuses on reform of the institutional sector of
financial products and use of those products that pushed the system to the edge of the
precipice there is an entire section of Dodd-Frank allocated to the reform of consumer
finance. There is no debate that subprime mortgages played their part in the financial
crisis with the blame spread across consumers, banks, and the government.

However

many consumer reform items that are contained Section X of the Act have nothing to do
with mortgages and contributed nothing to the root causes of the financial crisis. Section
X, which resulted in the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), is
an example of pork-barrel legislation at its finest. One of the big differences between the
CFPB and the other regulatory bodies is the lack of congressional oversight on the CFPB.
They are unique from their regulator brethren in that they are not subject to the
congressional appropriations process. This feature, as well as the recess appointment of
Richard Cordray as director, has led to a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
CFPB.xlv While there are many elements relating to consumer protection the Act this
paper will focus on only one of those sections and its impact to consumers. Its official
name is “The Final Remittance Rule (Amendment to Reg E).” However, it is known by a
whole assortment of names including “Remittance Transfers” and “Dodd- Frank
1073”.xlvi For purposes of this paper, we will refer to this regulation as “Dodd-Frank
1073”.
Prior to jumping into the analysis of Dodd-Frank 1073 let’s revisit some of the
basics elements of consumer theory, one of the building blocks of microeconomic theory.
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Consumer theory rests on a couple of basic assumptions, first of which is that individuals
are rational decision makers. Despite the fact that an individual may make an irrational
decision, it is thought on the whole that consumers make decisions rationally. Another
underlying assumption of consumer theory is scarcity. That is, there are a limited number
of resources available for consumption. Expanding on the concept of scarcity we see the
emergence of consumption bundles where each bundle is a set of goods available for
consumption.

As Jehle and Reny (2001) point out a consumer’s goal is to seek the

specific consumption bundle from the set of available bundles that is most preferred.xlvii
The bundle that is “most preferred” is measured by the notion of utility. Utility is a way
to measure things that are hard to quantify, specifically how a consumer is “better off”
from the consumption of a good. We now come full circle back to the concept of the
rational individual. The rational consumer seeks to maximize his or her utility given a
fixed budget. In other words they consumer the best possible combination of goods as
given their set of preferences and budget. Mathematically, Jehle and Reny represent this
as:  max 𝑢 𝐱    𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐩 ∗ 𝐱   ≤ 𝐲 .

Where u(x) represents the utility for consuming

consumption bundle x subject to the constraint that the price (p) of consumption bundle x
is less than or equal to the budget y.xlviii
Everything an individual does in the course of the day, week, or year makes up a
component of their utility function for that time period. One of these elements is the
movement of money or payments. There are countless reasons for making a payment and
nearly as many mediums to deliver that payment. The simplest of these mediums is also
the oldest, physical delivery. The payment space is not isolated from the advances in
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technology. Some of the largest banks in the US allow you to pay bills from your
mobile phone, money can be transferred from one individual to another over the internet,
and the clearest example is the rise of credit and debit cards for transactional based
payments. As Jonkey and Kosse [2008] point out, consumers favor the speed and safety
of electronic credit transfers compared with their paper counterparts.xlix From the
comforts of a chair at the beach one can pay their car bill, mortgage, and electric bill all
with a couple of taps on their smartphone.
What factors caused the market to develop in the way that it did? Part of the
market development can be attributed to the rise of the Internet. The Internet has
connected the world in such a way that now with a couple of clicks one can see the
weather in Sydney, check the news in New York, and search for hotel rooms in London.
Naturally, markets have developed allowing consumers to buy and sell goods over the
Internet. As a result of remote buying and selling there developed need for remote
payment systems needed to handle such transactions. There are Point of Sale transactions
where debit or credit cards are the common mediums of payment, as well as transfers of
funds for remote settlement. The former mainly involves payments between an
individual and a retailer or other entity. The latter is usually on a more individual-toindividual basis or for something of high value where the amount of the payment is
typically not paid via credit card. Another factor is the increase in global migration. In
simplest terms, the world’s population is moving farther away from their respective place
of birth; more people in absolute terms are migrating to another country.l The causes of
this go beyond the scope of this paper but in general the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
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rise of free market centers in Asia and the Middle East, and the economic environment of
some traditional economic centers have turned many workers into expatriates, in search
of a better life. This results in an increase in demand from consumers to send money
back “home”. From a cross-border payment perspective, an electronic credit transfer has
many benefits over their paper-based counterparts, of which, speed of transaction time
being the predominant one. Also, the transaction costs borne by banks are cheaper for
electronic credit transfers when compared to paper-based. Thus there is an incentive for
banks to push consumers toward these products.li However, when compared to their
domestic counterparts cross-border electronic transfers are perceived as more confusing
and costly from a sender’s perspective. The International Bank Account Number (IBAN)
and Bank Identifier Code (BIC) required on most cross-border transactions exemplify
this point. A survey conducted as a part of Jonkey and Kosse’s research points out that
58% of their population did not know what the purpose of the IBAN and BIC codes as
well as a staggering 67% also stated that they would not know where to find them.lii By
removing this confusion in the minds of consumers, one would expect to see further
increases in the number of consumers using cross-border electronic credit transfers to
deliver funds. This is precisely the payment space that is the focus of the Dodd-Frank
1073 rule and for those payments subject to Dodd-Frank 1073, the new regulation is truly
a game changer.
The focus of the Dodd-Frank 1073 regulation is centered on reforming crossborder electronic funds transfers initiated by a consumer. The intent of the statue is to
provide increased consumer protections with respect to cross-border payments. The
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underlying cause of this regulation stemmed from individuals sending money to family
members abroad and the amount expected was not always the amount that arrived.
Senator Daniel Akaka from Hawaii, author of Dodd-Frank section 1073, had these
comments on the final rule issued by the CFPB.
"Now, simple disclosures will empower consumers with important information, including
the amount of currency that the recipient will receive, the promised date of delivery, and the rights
of the sender regarding the resolution of errors. This is the information that consumers need to
know so they can properly compare the rates and fees deducted from their remittances. “

liii

The new regulation requires a disclosure of all fees and taxes associated with the
payment, the exchange rate used in the transaction, the date the funds will be available to
the recipient, as well as provisions for cancellation and error claims. Simply put, the
consumer that is initiating the payment will receive a disclosure stating all of the charges
associated with the cost of the transaction that will allow the consumer to “price shop” to
the determine the remittance transfer provider that can provide the desired service for the
best cost. This all sounds great on paper. The consumer has more information about the
costs of the transaction and can make the decision that is the most cost effective. Based
on our consumer theory discussed above this should allow for an increase in consumer
utility as their decision to select the most cost-effective provider maximizes the amount
of income available for consumption of other goods.
The regulation does not prevent institutions from charging the sender and/or
receiver for these services.

A role of financial intermediaries is to bring market

participants together creating transactional efficiency. They have asymmetrical
information advantages based on their position and are thus are able to realize gains from
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brining buyers and sellers together. However, in the broader picture, they serve as a key
function in society. We would not have the globalized market that we do today if buyers
and sellers had to spend all their time searching each other out. Intermediaries serve that
function allowing for buyers and sellers to spend time on other things leading to a greater
benefit for all.

A presumed additional benefit to the consumer’s consumption is the

notion that the increased transparency in charging practices should foster price
competition that will drive down the cost to send a cross-boarder payment. The question
becomes, do the facts support these presumed benefits. We now examine the two major
types of payment systems to see if the expected result of improving consumer utility
through price transparency and reduced costs will come to fruition.

Closed-Looped vs. Open Networks: Trade Offs
The first payment type we will examine is known as a “closed loop payment
network”. A key characteristic of the closed network system is that the entire flow of the
payment stays within the network of the provider. Western Union is a classic example of
a “closed loop network” provider in that funds are sent from one Western Union office to
another. The payment never leaves the Western Union network and thus the provider can
exhibit greater control over the payment. This greater control should lead to a burden of
compliance that is relatively straightforward to implement. Since the payment travels in
a closed network the amount of charges applied, exchange rate used, and date the funds
will be available should be readily available and thus would be just be required to be
disclosed, if they aren’t currently disclosed.
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Since closed networks seem to have desired result in the payment space, how
come they aren’t used exclusively for sending cross-border payments? It comes back to
consumers’ utility maximization. The positives of a closed loop network are also drivers
of a big negative in terms of presence. A closed looped network requires that there are
branches of the closed loop at both ends of the transaction, which can lead to significant
costs for a company. However, given the presence of a Western Union agent in over 200
countries and 500,000 locations that burden of a closed looped network does not seem to
be as big of a burden for a consumer’s choice.liv That said, the requirement to be on site
for both sides of the transaction does pose a significant barrier to entry for aspiring
competitors to Western Union, MoneyGram, and the likes. The bigger downside to the
closed looped network is the timing of delivery. In a fully closed loop system there is a
requirement for both the sender and the recipient to physically be present when sending
and receiving funds respectively. These money transfer organizations’ specialty is the
cash-to-cash transaction space. The opportunity cost of time negatively impacts the
utility functions of the sender and the recipient.
There is an option available when sending a payment via a money service
provider to have funds deposited into a bank account at the receiving end. However, this
takes the payment out of the completely closed looped space. Let’s walk through an
example to illustrate this. John, located in the United States, wants to send $1,000 USD
to his grandmother located in country B. However, he doesn’t want his grandmother to
have to travel somewhere to get the funds but, would rather the payment just be
deposited into her bank account.

Whether it is implicit or explicit, John is helping his
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grandmother maximize her utility by not having to make a trip to pick up the funds. So,
John initiates the transaction with a money service provider to transfer funds from the
US office to his grandmother’s bank account at the National Bank of Country B. Once
John has made the payment for the transaction, the first leg of the payment travels in the
closed network environment from the US to country B all within the money service
provider’s system. It is the next part where the break from the closed network happens.
The money service provider may or may not have an account at the National Bank of
Country B. If they do, they would initiate a SWIFT messagelv (in this case an MT 103)
instructing National Bank of Country B to pay John’s grandmother. If instead, they have
an account at the Commercial Bank of Country B they would send the SWIFT MT 103 to
the Commercial Bank of Country B instructing payment to be made to John’s
grandmother at National Bank of Country B. Commercial Bank sends the payment
through the local clearing system to National Bank who credits the funds to John’s
grandmother account. The latter half of this transaction, the portion that results in the
funds being credited to John’s grandmother’s account, enters the open network
environment. Of course, this extra step to credit the funds to an account is not done for
free, and depending on the arrangements of the particular situation, either can affect the
amount of funds John’s grandmother receives and/or is borne by the money service
provider, who in turn could pass the cost off to John.lvi
The alternative to the closed loop system is the open loop network where many
participants send payments to each other via various settlement and communications
systems. The parties involved in an open loop network usually are deposit taking
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financial institutions, but may also include broker-dealers and other non-bank financial
institutions (NBFIs). The most common form of an open network payment type is the
wire transfer. Wire transfers provide a quick and secure method to deliver high-value
payments across the globe. This is one reason why the market developed; there was a
demand for the ability for consumers to deliver large amounts of money in a quick and
secure manner. Since wires are the most common cross border open network transaction,
that will serve as our focus for analyzing the open network market. We begin with the
basics of a cross-border wire transaction.
While certain financial institutions do offer variations, the standard among wire
transactions are account-to-account transactions.

In an account-to-account transaction

both the sender and the receiver must have established accounts with the sending and
beneficiary institutions. Also, there is no delivery of physical funds as the payment goes
from one account to another. Since Dodd-Frank 1073 focuses solely on US originated
payments,

we will focus the description of a cross-border payment flow to a US

originated transfer in US dollars. The sender of the payment holds an account at a US
bank and wishes to initiate a cross-border payment to an account at a bank in a foreign
country, known as the beneficiary bank
1. The	
   customer	
   selects	
   the	
   amount	
   of	
   funds	
   he	
   wants	
   to	
   transfer	
   and	
   the	
  
process	
   begins	
   with	
   internal	
   movement	
   through	
   the	
   US	
   bank’s	
   operations	
  
center	
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2. Here	
  is	
  where	
  we	
  see	
  if	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  difference	
  in	
  domestic	
  wire	
  payments	
  (sent	
  
directly	
   through	
   Fedwire	
   to	
   the	
   receiving	
   bank)	
   and	
   cross-‐border	
   wire	
  
payments	
  which	
  typically	
  take	
  one	
  of	
  two	
  paths:	
  
a. The	
   beneficiary	
   bank	
   has	
   a	
   direct	
   relationship	
   with	
   the	
   US	
   bank	
  
initiating	
  the	
  transaction;	
  the	
  foreign	
  beneficiary	
  bank	
  has	
  an	
  account	
  
on	
  the	
  books	
  of	
  the	
  US	
  bank.	
  	
  	
  In	
  this	
  case,	
  what	
  is	
  known	
  as	
  a	
  “book	
  
transfer”	
  is	
  made	
  by	
  the	
  originating	
  bank	
  from	
  the	
  sender’s	
  account	
  to	
  
the	
   foreign	
   beneficiary	
   bank’s	
   account	
   	
   by	
   	
   including	
   	
   an	
  
accompanying	
   SWIFT	
   MT	
   103	
   to	
   the	
   beneficiary	
   bank	
   with	
  
instructions	
  	
  for	
  further	
  credit	
  to	
  the	
  recipient’s	
  account.	
  
b. The	
   beneficiary	
   bank	
   does	
   not	
   have	
   a	
   direct	
   relationship	
   with	
   the	
  
originating	
   US	
   bank	
   but	
   rather	
   has	
   a	
   relationship	
   with	
   another	
  
correspondent	
   bank	
   in	
   the	
   US.	
   	
   In	
   this	
   case	
   the	
   originating	
   bank	
   sends	
  
the	
   payment	
   through	
   one	
   of	
   the	
   US	
   clearing	
   systems	
   (CHIPS	
   or	
  
Fedwirelvii)	
  to	
  the	
  US	
  correspondent	
  of	
  the	
  beneficiary	
  bank	
  and	
  either	
  
advises	
  the	
  beneficiary	
  bank	
  directly,	
  known	
  as	
  “advise	
  and	
  cover”	
  in	
  
the	
   industry,	
   or	
   through	
   the	
   US	
   clearing	
   payment	
   message	
   by	
   sending	
  
the	
   message	
   serially.	
   	
   The	
   US	
   correspondent	
   then	
   preforms	
   a	
   book	
  
transfer	
  crediting	
  the	
  funds	
  to	
  the	
  beneficiary	
  bank’s	
  account.	
  
3. The	
   beneficiary	
   bank	
   now	
   has	
   the	
   funds	
   in	
   	
   its	
   account	
   and	
   processes	
   the	
  
payment	
   for	
   further	
   credit	
   to	
   the	
   recipient’s	
   account.	
   	
   If	
   the	
   recipient’s	
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account	
  is	
  denominated	
  in	
  a	
  currency	
  other	
  than	
  USD,	
  a	
  foreign	
  exchange	
  will	
  
also	
  be	
  preformed	
  prior	
  to	
  crediting	
  	
  the	
  funds.	
  
In some instances there may be additional intermediary banks involved in the transaction.
The route of the wire or transfer is all driven based on the relationships established
between the originating and beneficiary banks. Now that we have described the steps in
the payment flow, let’s look at how charges are typically applied. As previously stated,
the heart of Dodd-Frank 1073 is full transparency in the amount of charges that affects
the net amount received by the sender. The first charge we will review can simply be
called the “outgoing wire fee.” This would be the fee that the originating bank charges
the sender to initiate a wire transfer.

The amount associated with this charge is

dependent on the sender’s arrangement with the originating bank. Naturally, some clients
may receive this service for free. This charge is typically debited from the account in
addition to the amount being sent. So, if a sender wants to wire $1,000 USD and it costs
$30 to send USD internationally, the sender’s account will be debited for $1,030 with
$1,000 sent for processing. The originating bank will then make a book transfer to the
beneficiary bank and depending on the relationship arrangements made between the two
banks, the beneficiary bank may elect to be charged separately to receive the incoming
wire or have the charge deducted out of the proceeds. This deduction from the proceeds
is known as a “lifting fee” in that the fee is lifted from the principal of the transfer instead
of charged separately. The number of intermediary banks involved in the payment chain
could affect the number of lifting fees applied. However, market practice is for there to
be a two lifting fee maximum deducted from the payment. Although in many instances,
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there may be only one or no lifting fee applied. The third type of fee that may be applied
relates to the crediting of funds to the beneficiary by the beneficiary’s bank. Similar to
the fact that there is an outgoing wire fee to send a payment, typically there is a fee
charged to receive an incoming payment to an account. This fee is known as an
“incoming wire fee.” How this fee is applied, either deducted from principal or charged
separately, depends on the beneficiary bank’s fee structure and varies from bank to bank.
The method of application of the incoming wire fee does not affect the recipient’s utility
because the recipient bears the cost either way, but is just a timing difference.
Dodd-Frank 1073: The Industry Game Changer
While briefly discussed before, we will now explore the Final Remittance Rule
published by the CFPB on February 7, 2012, as well as the revised proposal made to
the rule on December 21, 2012, . The main theme of the rule is the increased consumer
protections as they relate to cross-border electronic transfers initiated by an individual in
the United States, whose account is domiciled in the US, to any recipient located in a
foreign country. For purpose of this rule transfers to and from the US to the five official
US territories are not considered to be cross-border electronic transfers. The protections
the sender receives includes a transparent description of all charges to be applied, foreign
exchange rate if there will be a currency exchange during the transaction, as well as any
taxes deducted out of the payment that are a result of an institution providing the
servicing of the payment. So theoretically, in the end, the sender will see a full picture
and know exactly the net amount the beneficiary will receive. The disclosure must also
include the date that the funds will be available to the recipient. Additional protections
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include the ability to cancel the transaction up to 30 minutes after authorization of
payment, as well as 180 days to file a claim where there was an error with respect to any
item on the receipt disclosure. For example, if the receipt said that the funds would be
available in three days time but something caused the funds to be delayed, that would
result in an error and cause a list of remedy options available to the sender. In light of the
previous description of cross-border wire transfers, we will examine how this rule will
impact the process and where some elements of the rule will be very difficult to
implement.
There are five specific elements that may affect the payment amount that are
required to be clearly displayed on the disclosure in order that the sender may understand
the true cost of the transaction. While the disclosure contains numerous other
information, these five elements are at the heart of the intent of the regulation , along
with the date the funds are available to the recipient ( which appears on the receipt once
the customer has authorized payment of the transaction). As mentioned before, this
disclosure is a positive and should improve consumer utility because consumers are now
more informed and can choose the remittance transfer provider that will suit their needs
the best. This disclosure requirement is in line with the theorem that a rational consumer
makes decisions based on their utility maximization. These five disclosure elements are:
(1) the fees charged by the remittance transfer provider (“Transfer Fees”), (2) the taxes
collected by the remittance transfer provider (“Transfer Taxes”), (3) the exchange rate
used in the transaction, (4) the fees charged by parties other than the remittance transfer
provider (“Other Fees”), and (5) taxes collected by parties other than the remittance
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transfer provider (“Other Taxes”). The intent is that the sender now can see a transparent
view of the elements that impact the net amount received by the recipient. The first two
elements, “Transfer Fees” and “Transfer Taxes” are the easiest requirements for
remittance transfer providers to provide since they already have this information at their
disposal; they are the charges and taxes the remittance provider collects. The other
three elements may pose some challenges and thus we will examine these three
requirements in more detail.
Let’s first examine the disclosure of the exchange rate when there is an exchange
of currency , as, on paper, this seems to be relatively straightforward. Currently in the
market, cross-border transfers initiated within the US are typically sent in US dollars
(USD). Data shows that in 2012 USD represented over 88% of the traffic going from the
US to another country.lviii

This includes traffic initiated by all individuals and

corporations, which may present some bias in the data, but directionally the data tells a
very interesting piece in that most of the traffic flowing out of the US is going out in
USD. The reasons for this could be endless: familiarity, obligation must be paid in USD,
beneficiary’s account is denominated in USD, foreign country uses USD as local
currency, beneficiary is likely to get a better FX rate at his/her bank, etc.. However, it is
safe to say that there is a large portion of this traffic that prior to settlement into the
beneficiary’s account is converted to a currency other than USD and then credited to the
beneficiary’s account in that converted currency. Now that we have described the current
market practice, let’s examine the impact of the requirements in the Dodd-Frank 1073
regulation.
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The regulation requires the exchange rate that is used must be quoted in a
consistent standard and rounded to an amount between two and four decimal places. The
easiest way for the remittance transfer providers to meet

this requirement of

the

regulation is to apply the foreign exchange upfront and make the payment in the other
currency. While this is fairly straightforward for the providers to comply with, this may
result in a limit of consumer choice. Institutions may limit the consumer’s ability to send
USD to an account known to be denominated in a foreign currency because of the
difficulty in disclosing the exchange rate as required by law. There may be additional
costs to the consumer because the rate of exchange used by the consumer’s remittance
transfer provider may be less favorable than the rate applied when the funds are being
credited at the beneficiary institution.

Overall, the requirement of disclosing the

exchange rate to the sender should not have a negative impact on consumer utility.
Actually, it will produce some positive benefits to the remittance transfer providers by
shifting the revenue that stems from the foreign exchange conversion from the foreign
institutions upstream to the remittance transfer providers.
Now let’s move to the disclosure of foreign taxes collected by the recipient
institution, the “Other Taxes” element of the disclosure.

This disclosure of tax

requirement is isolated to taxes that are required to be collected as a direct result of
servicing a wire transfer. The regulation originally required that all taxes imposed by
parties other than the remittance transfer provider must be disclosed, including nonnational taxes such as provincial or regional. This would be very challenging for the
remittance transfer providers to comply with because of the sheer number of possibilities.
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There are roughly 200 countries in the world and if required to capture each of the
possible local and regional taxes,
exponentially.

the number of data points required

increases

Also, after research among the industry relating to collecting tax

information at just the national level, the data shows that taxes are not regularly imposed
on servicing of a wire transfer.

Furthermore, the amount of the tax being collected is

typically much smaller in magnitude compared to the fees imposed. Essentially the cost
burden required to collect the information at the level of detail needed didn’t yield the
incremental benefit of disclosing these sub-national taxes to the consumer. On December
20, 2012, the CFPB provided a reprieve from this sub-national tax requirement by
issuing a revised proposal of this provision of the final regulation, along with a few
other provisions. The revised proposal gives the remittance transfer providers the ability
to disclose only national level taxes, provided they inform the consumer that this amount
of “Other Taxes” is an estimate and sub-national taxes may be imposed.lix

Also, the

revised proposal provides flexibility in that if a particular recipient institution imposes
the tax in a manner differently than described by the letter of the law. In addition it also
allows the remittance transfer provider to assume the worst possible tax bracket of the
recipient, if that variable affects the tax collected and the sender does not know the
specific variables that will affect the tax rate. While the proposed rule allows for the
disclosure of taxes imposed only at the national level has not been finalized, it is widely
expected to be adopted without significant change. The excessive cost burden required to
collect and maintain sub-national taxes placed on the transfer providers did not yield
enough of a benefit to the consumer. Furthermore, it is likely that this requirement would
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have driven providers out of the market as well as resulting in a portion of the cost
burden being passed onto the consumers. The biggest challenge with this requirement is
the on-going maintenance of the information.

Collecting the information will be

strenuous, but keeping the information current and fresh on a real-time basis will be a
much bigger hurdle for remittance transfer providers to comply with. Since this element
of the regulation is independent from a consumer’s

choice of remittance transfer

provider, this is one area where collaboration is possible without giving away any
competitive advantage as well as possibly helping to ease the total cost burden across the
market participants.
The aspect of the transparency requirements that is causing the most headaches
among the market participants is the display of third-party fees; “Other Fees” on the
disclosure documents. As previously discussed, it is very common during a cross-border
payment transaction for there to be multiple stops in the payment flow. As a result of
servicing the transfer along the way, many institutions charge a fee for this service.
There are many ways for payment providers to apply these fees. One way would be to
bill the institution that sent the payment to them. For example, bank A (US bank) sends
bank B (foreign bank with account at bank A) one thousand wire transfers per month and
at the end of the month bank A sends bank B a bill for the cost of crediting those one
thousand transfers to bank B’s account. Over the years a practice has developed among
institutions to shift some of the cost burden off to others. Instead of being charged
separately, institutions would strike agreements to take the fee off the principal of the
cross-border payment.

The beneficiary of the payment now bears the cost burden
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because the beneficiary receives a lesser amount due to a portion of the payment being
lifted off of it as a service fee by market participants. The specifics aspects of this fee are
typically unknown to both the sender and the beneficiary. Also, depending on the type
of relationship the beneficiary has with the beneficiary’s institution, a charge may be
applied to credit the funds to their account.
The challenge facing the remittance transfer providers is how to disclose to a
customer the total amount of fees that will be applied as a result of the payment. First,
let’s examine the lifting fees that institutions take off the principal of the payment. One
option institutions have is to use an approach where they instruct the other institutions
not to take any fees off the payment and for not taking a fee off the payment they can
claim a charge back to the sending institution. We will call this the “charges OUR
method.” This approach of guaranteeing that the principal of the payment is not touched
is executed in practice by placing a code word in field 71 of the SWIFT message.
However, it is not common practice today for institutions to provide this service on all
cross-border payments. Moving to a “charges OUR method” will result in additional
costs to remittance transfer providers through increased claim backs for charges and it
would not be surprising if a portion of these incremental costs are passed off to the
customer.

However, this still does not solve the remittance transfer provider’s

requirement to disclose the fees the recipient institution charges the beneficiary, which
we analyze shortly. Another option that remittance transfer providers can undertake is to
keep the payment practice as is and just disclose the fees taken. Dodd-Frank 1073 does
not prevent institutions from taking fees off consumer cross-border payments, but just

50

requires that if there are fees then they must be disclosed. While there needs to be
significant work done to make this a reality, is it possible for a remittance transfer
provider to be able to disclose these fees every time? In some cases a provider could
disclose these fees because the beneficiary institution holds an account with the
remittance transfer provider. Since the transfer happens all within the provider’s books,
it would be possible for the provider to know what amount, if any, is deducted from the
principal of the payment.

In other cases though, the payment must be sent to a

correspondent of the beneficiary bank because the beneficiary bank does not hold an
account with the remittance transfer provider. It would be very difficult to know the
exact arrangement the beneficiary institution has with its correspondent. Remittance
transfer providers do have the authority to estimate this fee, but that authority expires in
July of 2015, roughly two years after the regulation is expected to take effect.
The December revised proposal provides further authority to estimate when it
comes to the fee the recipient institution charges the beneficiary to credit the funds to the
beneficiary’s account. Prior to the revised proposal, the authority to estimate this fee
was also set to expire in July 2015.

This would have been very challenging for

remittance transfer providers. A particular institution may have endless arrangements
depending on the status of the beneficiary. It would require remittance transfer providers
to know the exact status of the beneficiary with the recipient institution. The revised
proposal allows institutions to rely on publish fee schedules, as well as fee schedules of
similar institutions in the event that the recipient institution does not have a published fee
schedule. Substantial effort is still required to collect this information, even with the
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further relaxations from the December

revised proposal, but it is possible for an

institution to accomplish if given the proper resource devotion. Essentially, the revised
proposal allows a remittance transfer provider to assume the beneficiary is a typical
average customer of the recipient institution who would not have any special
arrangement. An element that is not part of the pre-payment disclosure, but provided on
the receipt after the payment is authorized is the date the funds will be available to the
recipient. The revised rule allows for banks to estimate a date and note that funds may
be available sooner. This, coupled with the elements of the pre-payment disclosure,
provides the end-to-end transparency for the sender of the payment. The sender now has
the ability to know how much the recipient will receive net of all charges and when they
will receive it.
Are Consumers Better Off?
While there are significant challenges to the sender in collecting and maintaining
all the information required to be disclosed upfront, it is possible for the sender to meet
the requirements of the regulation. Since it is possible to meet the requirements, will the
consumer experience the utility boost provided by transparency? According to a survey
conducted by the technology firm Fundtech, most financial institutions believe, with a
resounding consistency, that the overall impact of this regulation will be negative.
Consumers will see little, if any, gains and there will be significant negative impact to
small firms in the payments business.lx
So the question is, will the regulation have the intended impact or will there be
the consistent theme of negative unintended consequences due to a poorly implemented
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regulation? Well, it is likely that the significant increased costs incurred by remittance
transfer providers will be passed off in some form to the consumer. The question then
becomes, does the benefit of transparency outweigh the incremental cost the consumer
bears? One case can be made that transparency of prices will result in price competition
among producers and thus the consumer will be better off. While that theory holds true,
it also hinges on the number of producers in the market remaining fixed. The significant
cost required for compliance as a remittance transfer provider is likely to push some of
those market participants who are on the margin out of the business.
One variable affecting the compliance cost is the size of the remittance transfer
provider. Small providers may benefit from less complexity compared to their larger
counterparts but they are also harmed by their size. The financial supermarkets of the
largest banks realize gains from economies of scale. They have a global presence and
deep correspondent networks that are lacking in the small regional banks.

The

multinational component of the largest remittance transfer providers presents them with a
competitive advantage in the opportunity cost required to collect the information needed
for the disclosure elements of the regulation. Their size benefits them in other aspects as
well. Such as, dedicating sufficient resources to the efforts needed to transform their
payment platforms into becoming compliant with the regulation. Keeping in line with
the classification of banks in relation to the Derivatives section of this paper, Mid-Size
regional banks are defined as those institutions with $10-50 billion in assets. Meanwhile,
according to Federal Reserve data collected in September 2012, the four largest financial
institutions in the US each have over $1.3 trillion in assets; institutions 11-15 have a
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combined asset value of $1.2 trillion.lxi In other words, merging these institutions would
only create the 5th largest bank in the US. One can argue that this is the evidence of “Too
Big to Fail” and while that topic is not the theme of this chapter, Skeel points out that the
Dodd-Frank Act does not address the “Too Big to Fail” size of the banks at the top and
may further enhance their systemic importance as the entrants to the market are turned off
by the costs of regulation, a view shared by Jamie Dimon of JP Morgan Chase.lxii The
“big four” institutionslxiii are all significant participants in the retail banking market in
which the clientele that falls under the scope of Dodd-Frank 1073 reside. Even if the cost
for compliance was double for the big banks compared to the mid-size regionals, their
sheer size makes it easier to allocate the resources needed for compliance. For many of
these smaller providers who provide cross-border payment services as an ancillary
benefit to their clients, they will have to examine and make a determination whether to
continue to provide these services when compliance with the Dodd-Frank 1073
requirements is in effect. One institution has already decided that it will no longer offer
cross-border wire transfers due to the requirements of Dodd-Frank 1073. On November
20, 2012, the Federal Home Loan Bank of New York announced that it was exiting the
international wire business at the end of the year as a result Dodd-Frank 1073.lxiv
Another option would be for these mid-size regional banks to leverage the larger banks
payment systems to process their Dodd-Frank payments.

These largest financial

institutions, which have extensive retail banking divisions, also have wholesale banking
units. As certain mid-size regional banks can no longer afford to be a direct participant
in the cross-border payment market, there is an incentive for the bigger banks to develop
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solutions that they can sell to other banks in addition to their own retail solution. Again
the economy of scale advantage favors the big banks and here the question becomes what
is the net effect to the consumer?

As discussed in the description of cross-border

payments, adding intermediaries to the payment chain correlates directly to an increased
cost of the transaction. The mid-size regional bank will face increase cost since they will
have to go through a US intermediary instead of being a direct participant in the crossborder payment market. It does not take much imagination to envision that at least a
portion of this incremental cost will be passed off to the sender. This reduction in the
supply of remittance transfer providers will temper the effect on prices of providing
transparency.

Furthermore, the consumers whose institutions no longer offer cross-

border payment services will have to find a new provider for their cross-border payment
services.
Another likely outcome of this regulation is a reduction in the supply of
destinations where a cross-border payment can be sent. Even the largest institutions,
whose scale yields them a competitive advantage to collect information, will face
struggles getting the necessary information needed to deliver payments to the same set of
markets that they do today. The December proposal eased some of the burden, but did
not completely lift it. From a risk management perspective it would not be surprising to
see institutions begin to limit Dodd-Frank 1073 payments to markets where they have
sufficient information to reasonably disclose the charges to the customer. As mentioned
earlier, there is likely to be limits in the currencies available for delivery because if a
foreign exchange is to occur, the rate used to convert the funds must be disclosed.
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Expanding on that, it would not be surprising if entire markets, regions, and institutions
are no longer available to receive a Dodd-Frank 1073 payment because the remittance
transfer provider lacks sufficient information to meet the requirements of the regulation
for that particular payment. This clearly has negative implications on the consumer who
must now

find another method to deliver the payment to

the consumer’s desired

location. The opportunity costs tied to finding another method to execute the payment
have a negative impact on the consumer’s utility, the exact opposite intention of the
Dodd-Frank 1073 regulation.
Yes, some consumers will experience an increase in utility from this transparency,
but for many the cost that is imposed on them because of this transparency may exceed
the benefit. It is unlikely that Dodd-Frank 1073 will result in a reduction of prices borne
by the sender of the transaction. Some portion of the cost for compliance is likely to be
passed off to the consumer. Also, the number of market participants is likely to decrease
as those near the margin exit the business in the face of the new costs. This reduction in
the number of remittance transfer providers means it is less likely we will see prices
driven down as a result of transparency.

We may see institutions strike bilateral

agreements with foreign banks for special processing of Dodd-Frank 1073 payments.
That may make the costs associated with a cross-border payment more consistent across
the various countries of the world, but it is unlikely to bring prices down on a global
scale. In the end, the Dodd-Frank 1073 regulation has good intentions, but in practice
will unlikely have as much of a positive impact as regulators envision. Consumers will
likely have less choice of remittance transfer providers and increased costs, which
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counteracts any utility benefit gained by transparency and additional protections of DoddFrank 1073. The only one who truly benefits from Dodd-Frank 1073 is the beneficiary
of the payment. The sender will now be able to tell the beneficiary the amount of funds
the beneficiary will receive and that they will be available by a particular date. Also, if a
majority of the industry moves to a “charges OUR method,” the beneficiary will receive
added benefits because they no longer bear the cost of having a fee deducted from the
principal of the payment. It shall be very interesting to see how this develops once in
practice. If there is a successful implementation of the rule, it would not be surprising to
see similar regulations established in other countries.
US consumers whose utility should experience an increase from transparency are
likely to experience the opposite effect driven by a combination of higher prices, more
restrictive options, and potentially the need to find a new medium to execute the crossborder payment if their traditional providers decide to exit the market. Remittance
transfer providers are also likely to experience negative effects driven from the high cost
of compliance and the ability for some people to game the system, although the recent
proposal in December helped eased this concern by shifting some of that risk from the
provider to the sender. International banking practice is to rely on the account number
when crediting the funds, but the original rule required that if the recipient named did
not receive funds because the account number was wrong on the transaction, then the
provider was on the hook for the full amount of the payment. Once a payment is sent
there is no legal obligation to return the funds. This provides a ripe opportunity for
fraudulent schemes. However, the revised proposed rule relieves the remittance transfer
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providers of this burden and puts the onus on the sender.lxv Some of the larger remittance
transfer providers will see some offsetting benefits because of increased market share as
the smaller providers on the margin exit the business. Overall, there will be fewer market
participants for the consumer to price shop the transaction as the regulation intended.
The only group that will likely benefit, although the magnitude of the benefit is uncertain,
are the recipients of the transactions. Indirectly they will receive the benefits of the
regulation, certainty on the amount received and when the funds will be available.
Naturally, they will need to be informed of this by the sender, but, nonetheless, they will
see the benefits of the regulation with little to no incremental costs borne by them. It is
unlikely that foreign financial institutions will raise their prices for crediting incoming
wire transfers due to a U.S. regulation that has little impact on them. While this rule is a
true game changer in the payments business, it is unlikely that the outcome to the various
market participants will yield the intended consequences the CFPB and Congress
envisioned. That is, enhancing consumer utility in the US through transparency and
greater protections around cross-border payments.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
Although we have only examined two aspects of the broader Act, it does allow for
some conclusions to be drawn related to the overall effectiveness of Dodd-Frank. While
there are many good things that will be accomplished as a result of Dodd-Frank it is hard
to envision that the intended consequences will come to their full effectiveness. For one
Dodd-Frank does not end “Too Big to Fail”. In fact, it likely increases the importance of
the largest financial institutions. The increased cost to become compliant with the
various rules of the Act will be a deterrent to new firms entering into the industry.
Furthermore, many of the smaller firms whose pool of resources is no where near the size
of the biggest banks will struggle to meet the costs of compliance, which could lead to
further consolidation.
The overhaul of the OTC derivatives market, while designed with good
intentions, may actually have the opposite effect on limiting the systemic risk those
financial instruments pose to the safety of the overall financial system. The cost of
compliance will prevent new firms from becoming swap dealers, the concentration of
exposure at the CCPs could be catastrophic if one were to fail, and the increased cost
borne by end-users who use swaps to mitigate risk, all counteract the good intentions of
bringing transparency to the OTC derivatives market and the benefits to go along with
that transparency. Consumers will likely be worse off as a result of the CFPB’s
Remittance Transfer rule through either increased costs to transact, limited choice in their
ability to make a payment to their intended recipient, or a combination of the two.
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Overall, Dodd-Frank does some good things and takes needed steps towards a
safer financial system. However, there are many missteps on the way that will limit the
overall effectiveness of the Act and its goal of preventing another financial crisis like the
2008-2009 one that brought the financial system and the global economy to the brink.
The financial system of the 21st century is a global one and, as such, meaningful reform
will require coordination at the global level.
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Figure 1- The Web of Financial Regulators

Retrieved from: http://blogs.hbr.org/ashkenas/2012/03/is-dodd-frank-too-complex-tow.html
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